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Decisions by firms and individuals on the extent of their tax payments have generally been 
treated as separate choices. Empirically, a positive relationship between corporate and 
personal income tax evasion can be observed. The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that 
a manager's decision on the firm's behaviour will be independent of his personal preferences 
if the gain from reducing corporate tax payments is certain, as in the case of tax avoidance. If, 
however, the firm evades taxes so that the manager's income depends on whether the firm's 
activities are detected or not, corporate and personal income tax evasion choices cannot be 
separated. 
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1. Introduction 
The decisions by firms, on the one hand, and individuals, on the other hand, on the extent of 
their tax payments have generally been investigated in isolation. However, the actions of firms 
are determined by individuals, i.e. managers or owners. The analytical separation between 
corporate tax avoidance or evasion choices and according decisions with respect to personal 
income taxes by the firms' decision-makers, therefore, relies on the implicit assumption that the 
determinants of the two actions are not related. However, if managers benefit from tax savings 
by firms, since their income is tied to after-tax profits, the separability assumption may not be 
warranted. According evidence is provided by Joulfaian (2000) who finds that American firms 
with assets of less than $ 10 Mill. that are managed by corporate officers who evade personal 
income taxes are more likely to evade corporate taxes and exhibit more non-compliance than 
firms that are managed by non-tax evading individuals. Moreover, the extent of personal 
income misreported is related positively to the amount of understated income by firms. 
The present paper analyses theoretically whether and how a manager's decision on corporate 
income tax avoidance or evasion is correlated with his or her choice of personal income tax 
evasion. If there is a systematic relationship, this will have important implications: first, from a 
theoretical perspective, modelling tax avoidance or evasion by firms as a decision on the 
optimal value of a single variable can yield inadequate predictions regarding the firms' 
behaviour. Second, from an empirical point of view, analyses of tax evasion or avoidance by 
firms are faced by an omitted variable bias, unless tax evasion behaviour of relevant decision 
makers is proxied adequately. Third, from a policy viewpoint, a unique relationship between 
personal and corporate income tax declarations represents a strong incentive for tax authorities 
to co-ordinate personal and corporate income tax audits. 
The manager's choice of personal income tax evasion is modelled as a decision of a strictly 
risk-averse individual under uncertainty in a standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
framework. Personal income is assumed to depend positively on after-tax profits. It turns out 
that the relationship between corporate and personal income tax declarations is crucially 
determined by the exact manner in which a firm's tax declarations affect its manager's income. 
Therefore, two basic cases are looked at: in the first, the net gain from reducing corporate 
income tax payments is certain. Such a setting can be interpreted as describing tax avoidance 
behaviour if this constitutes a costly but risk-less activity (Alm 1988, Cowell 1990a, p. 12f, 
Balestrino and Galmarini 2003, Marchese 2004). If, as in the second, the outcome resulting 
from reducing tax payments is uncertain, this can be viewed as evasion since illegal activities 
are punished with a positive probability. While tax avoidance may also involve uncertain   2
 
returns (cf. Alm and McCallin 1990), this interpretation is ruled out in the present context, to 
clearly distinguish activities which reduce tax payments with certainty from tax evasion. 
It is shown that corporate and personal income tax declarations will be independent in the case 
of corporate tax avoidance. This is because corporate avoidance maximises the firm's net 
profits and, hence, the manager's profit-related income. Since this income is the same in all 
states of the world, there is no gain to the manager from reducing the profit-related income to 
mitigate the risk which arises from personal income tax evasion. However, corporate income 
tax evasion decisions will generally be affected by personal income tax evasion choices, and 
vice versa. Such a linkage exists since corporate income tax evasion can be used to diversify 
the risk which personal income tax evasion entails. Accordingly, any variable which affects the 
attractiveness of personal income tax evasion alters the need to use corporate income tax 
evasion activities in order to reduce the variation in expected income. The nature of the 
relationship between personal and corporate income tax evasion cannot be predicted on the 
basis of the general model. Thus, a more restrictive setting is looked at in addition. In 
particular, it can be shown that if there is a perfect correlation of detection probabilities for 
personal and corporate income tax evasion, that is if detecting one evasion activity 
automatically implies being punished for the other as well, the amounts of evasion tend to be 
related inversely. Such choices are optimal because a perfect correlation of detection 
probabilities implies that an increase, for example, in personal income tax evasion will raise the 
utility loss due to insufficient corporate income declarations if evasion is detected, whereas the 
respective gains remain unaffected. 
While the relationship between corporate and personal income tax declarations, be it avoidance 
or evasion, has not been looked at analytically, the consequences of extending an individual's 
choice beyond a simple tax evasion gamble have been investigated. Landskroner et al. (1990), 
for example, assume that an individual initially determines the fraction of available wealth 
which is invested in a risky or risk-less asset. Given this choice, the risk-averse individual 
decides how much of the certain income from human capital to declare to tax authorities. Lee 
(1995) and Wrede (1995) assume that a risk-averse individual determines how much wealth to 
invest in a risky asset at the outset. Then returns from investments become known. Finally, the 
amount of tax evasion is determined. Hence, uncertainty about the returns from investment is 
resolved prior to the evasion decision. Moreover, Yaniv (1999) investigates the simultaneous 
decision to evade taxes and to launder undeclared income, with laundering being equivalent to 
a reduction of the fine for evasion. In contrast to the present analysis, none of these papers 
focus on the nature of the link between the two tax evasion (or avoidance) decisions. Alm   3
 
(1988) and Alm and McCallin (1990) investigate a joint decision about tax evasion and 
avoidance. In line with the assumption of the present paper, Alm (1988) views evasion as a 
decision under uncertainty, whereas avoidance is interpreted as (legal) non-payment of taxes 
involving certain costs. In contrast, Alm and McCallin (1990) model avoidance as yielding an 
uncertain return which differs in mean and variance from the return of evasion. Both papers 
look at personal income taxes and assume that an increase in, for example evasion, 
automatically reduces avoidance, for a given declaration of income to tax authorities. Finally, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) investigate optimal income tax evasion behaviour in a 
world in which individuals can under-declare income and overstate deductions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
looks at a setting in which the manager avoids corporate and evades personal income taxes. 
Section 4 allows for corporate tax evasion. Initially, uncorrelated detection probabilities for 
corporate and personal income tax evasion are assumed. Subsequently, the special case of 
correlated detection probabilities mentioned above is investigated. In all settings interior 
solutions are assumed. Moreover, an encompassing framework is employed in which the costs 




Suppose a strictly risk-averse, male
1 manager, characterised by von-Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences and the (indirect) utility function u, u' > 0, u'' < 0, can take two decisions: (1) how 
much of his personal income and (2) the amount of profits – or corporate income - to declare to 
tax authorities as tax basis. The executive's personal income consists of a fixed salary I and a 
fraction µ > 0 of after-tax profits of the firm which he manages. This dependency of personal 
income on profits ensures that the manager can benefit from lower tax payments by the firm. If 
the manager's income depended solely on gross-of-tax profits, he would have no incentives for 
reducing the firm's tax payments. Gross personal income Ψ is reduced by personal income tax 
payments, which equal the product of the amount of personal income Y which is declared to 
tax authorities and a linear tax rate t. Personal income tax evasion is detected with probability 
p. In such a case, a fine F[t(Ψ - Y)] has to be paid, which increases at a (weakly) increasing rate 
                                                 
1 Although there is evidence that the incidence and volume of tax evasion is greater among males than females 
(Baldry 1987), it is not overwhelming (Alm 1999). Thus, the assumption is made for expositional purposes only.   4
 
with the amount of taxes evaded t(Ψ - Y). Moreover, the marginal fine F' must exceed unity to 
ensure an interior solution. Hence, F' > 1 and F'' ≥ 0 are assumed to hold.
2  
Pre-tax profits Π are exogenous.
3 The manager declares a level of profits Φ to tax authorities, 
on which a corporate income or profit tax rate s > 0 is applied. The function C[(Π - Φ)s] 
represents either certain costs of avoidance or, alternatively, the fine if caught evading taxes, 
where C', C'' > 0 for Π - Φ > 0 is assumed. Fixed (marginal) costs of an audit or of zero tax 
avoidance could prevent the manager from engaging in evasion or avoidance activities. Since, 
however, the focus is on interior solutions, such an outcome can be neglected and C(0) = C'(0) 
= 0 is presumed. If profit tax evasion is fined, this will take place with probability q, being 
independent of the probability p, unless assumed otherwise in Section 4.2.  
If both evasion choices entail two possible outcomes which are determined independently – 
being caught evading taxes and being successful doing so –, the manager's actions can result in 
four possible states i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Since, moreover, the manager's choices of corporate and 
personal income declarations cannot differ in the four states, given simultaneous choices of 
income declarations, the expected utility V of the manager can be expressed as:
4 
[] Yt ]) s ) [( C s ( I qu ) p 1 ( V − Φ − Π − Φ − Π µ + − =        
[] ] t ) Y A [( F Yt ]) s ) [( C s ( I pqu − Ψ − − Φ − Π − Φ − Π µ + +      
[ ] Yt ) s ( I u ) q 1 )( p 1 ( − Φ − Π µ + − − +         
      [] ] t ) Y B [( F Yt ) s ( I u ) q 1 ( p − Ψ − − Φ − Π µ + − +      (1) 
In equation (1) ΨA := I +  ]) s ) [( C s ( Φ − Π − Φ − Π µ  and ΨB := I +  ) s ( Φ − Π µ  define taxable 
personal income. The fixed salary I will be set equal to zero in the subsequent analysis since its 
magnitude does not affect the correlation between personal and corporate income declarations. 
As indicated above, two basic cases will be looked at:   
                                                 
2 In general, the impact of changes in income or tax rates on evasion behaviour depends on the specification of the 
fine function (see Yitzhaki 1974, Andreoni et al. 1998, or Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). The relationship between 
optimal corporate and personal income declarations is not altered by assuming the penalty for evasion to be a 
function of undeclared income instead of taxes evaded.  
3 This assumption is made for analytical simplicity only and does not affect results. To illustrate, assume that 
profits are a function of some variable x which the manager can determine. If variations in x do not change the 
manager's utility, except for changes in profits, first maximising profits and then selecting income declarations 
will always be superior to any other combination of x and income declarations. Profits may obviously not be 
chosen maximally if achieving a profit maximum were costly for the manager. The interaction of tax evasion and 
effort choices in a principal-agent setting is investigated by Chen and Chu (2005), while Crocker and Slemrod 
(2005) examine implications for the tax enforcement structure in a related framework. 
4 If sequential choices of income declarations are presumed, the findings summarised below continue to hold. 
Therefore, sequential choices are not looked at further.   5
 
1. Corporate income tax avoidance. In this setting (Section 3), q = 1 holds.   
2. Corporate and personal income taxes are evaded. In this case (Section 4), 0 < q < 1 applies. 
 
3. Corporate Income Tax Avoidance 
Modelling the choice of corporate income tax declarations as a decision under certainty is 
incompatible with the usual notion of tax evasion activities as being a risky endeavour which 
can result in having to pay a penalty. Thus, the existence of certain gains is assumed to imply 
tax avoidance. The decisive feature of tax avoidance in the present analysis is, therefore, not 
the legal evaluation of according activities but whether or not its net gain is the same, 
irrespective of the outcome of the personal income tax evasion gamble. Maximising V with 
respect to profit declarations Φ and personal income statements Y, using ΨB = Ψ := 
]) s ) [( C s ( Φ − Π − Φ − Π µ ,  Yt ]) s ) [( C s ( : 1 − Φ − Π − Φ − Π µ = θ , and  ] t ) Y [( F 1 : 2 − Ψ − θ = θ  
yields: 
[] [] {} 0 ) t ] t ) Y [( ' F 1 ( 2 ' pu 1 ' u ) p 1 ( ) 1 ] s ) [( ' C ( s
V
= − Ψ − θ + θ − − Φ − Π µ =
Φ ∂
∂
   (2) 
[] [] {} 0 ]) t ) Y [( ' F 1 ( 2 ' pu 1 ' u ) p 1 ( t
Y
V
= − Ψ − θ + θ − − =
∂
∂
     (3) 
An optimal choice of Y according to (3) implies that the expression in curly brackets in (2) is 
positive, since F'[(Ψ - Y)t] > 1. Therefore, a simultaneous validity of the two first-order 
conditions requires C'[(Π - Φ)s] = 1. The second derivatives of V are negative. 
[] [] [] 0 2 t ] t ) Y [( ' ' F 2 ' pu 2 ) t ] t ) Y [( ' F t ( 2 ' ' pu 2 t 1 ' ' u ) p 1 (
2 Y
V 2




[] [] {} 0 ) t ] t ) [( ' F 1 ( 2 ' pu 1 ' u ) p 1 ( ] s ) [( ' ' C 2 s
2
V 2
< Ψ − Π − θ + θ − Φ − Π µ − =
Φ ∂
∂
   (4b) 
Furthermore, the cross derivative ∂2V/(∂Φ∂) and the product of ∂2V/(∂Φ∂x) and ∂2V/(∂Y∂x) 
for any variable x, x = t, p, s, Π, C', C, F', F,
5 are zero, given optimal choices in accordance 
with equations (2) and (3). The results can be summarised as: 
 
                                                 
5 Separate changes in C' and C imply that the marginal costs of tax avoidance can be altered without affecting its 
level and vice versa. This is feasible for a cost function C = C0 + C1[(Ψ - Y)t], C0, C1 > 0. An analogous 
argument applies for the penalty function F[(Ψ - Y)t] for personal income tax evasion and its parameters F' and F.   6
 
Proposition 1 
A strictly risk-averse manager's decision on corporate income tax avoidance will be unrelated 
to his choice of personal income tax evasion.  
Proposition 1 can be explained as follows: variations in corporate and personal income 
declarations affect the manager's expected utility in a fundamentally different manner. This is 
the case because any variation in personal income declarations directly alters the amount of 
personal income taxes paid, whereas a change in profit declarations and, hence, in profit-
related income may only change personal income tax payments if tax evasion is detected. 
Therefore, the marginal expected utility of higher profit declarations is still positive, given an 
optimal choice of personal income declarations, as a comparison of the expressions in curly 
brackets in equations (2) and (3) shows. The best the manager can do is to maximise profit-
related earnings, that is after- (profit-) tax profits, by equalising the firm's marginal costs and 
gains of profit declarations, implying C'[(Π – Φ)s] = 1. 
Proposition 1, hence, implies a further neutrality result in the analysis of tax declarations by 
firms. Not only can the decision about economic activity be separated from the tax evasion 
decision under a variety of circumstances,
6 but moreover, the choice on personal income tax 
evasion can be isolated from the decision about profit tax declarations if the latter represents a 
risk-less, albeit costly activity. Accordingly, the manager's personal preferences and, 
particularly, his degree of risk-aversion are without impact on the optimal amount of corporate 
income tax avoidance. 
 
4. Corporate Income Tax Evasion 
4.1 General Case 
Assume now that the reduction of corporate income tax payments entails the risk of being 
penalised for tax evasion. As profit and personal income declarations are determined 
simultaneously, the first-order conditions resulting from the maximisation of V in equation (1) 
are given by: 
[] [] {} ) t ] t ) Y A [( ' F 1 ( 2 ' pu 1 ' u ) p 1 ( q ) 1 ] s ) [( ' C ( s
V
− Ψ − θ + θ − − Φ − Π µ =
Φ ∂
∂
     
[ ] [ ] { } 0 ) t ] t ) Y B [( ' F 1 ( 4 ' pu 3 ' u ) p 1 ( ) q 1 ( s = − Ψ − θ + θ − − µ −    (5) 
                                                 
6 According results and exceptions are analysed by Wang and Conant (1988), Yaniv (1995, 1996), Marelli (1984), 
Marelli and Martina (1988), Lee (1998), and Panteghini (2000), inter alia.   7
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The optimal choice of corporate income tax evasion Φ will be independent of personal income 
tax evasion behaviour if ∂2V/(∂Φ∂Y) = 0. However, this cross-derivative cannot be signed. 
Therefore, without further structure on the optimisation problem, the relationship between 
optimal personal and corporate income tax evasion and the impact of exogenous variables on 
this relation cannot be determined. The results are summarised in: 
Proposition 2 
Optimal corporate and personal income tax evasion activities will generally not be 
independent. An unambiguous correlation in the amounts of personal and corporate income tax 
evasion does not exist. 
The intuition for the interdependence between corporate and personal income tax choices is the 
following: the manager's expected utility from a personal income tax declaration Y varies with 
the amount of corporate income which the firm actually has to pay to tax authorities, and vice 
versa. Therefore, optimal choices of Y and Φ are not independent. This contrasts with a 
situation in which the net gain from corporate income declarations is certain because in such a 
setting variations in corporate income declarations alter the payoff from personal income tax 
evasion by a multiple of 1 - C' and, hence, proportionally. If the returns from corporate income 
declarations are uncertain, however, variations in corporate income declarations will alter the 
payoff from personal income tax evasion by µs - or a multiple thereof - if corporate income tax 
evasion is not detected and by µsC' - or a multiple - if corporate tax evasion is detected. By 
adjusting personal income tax declarations the manager can, therefore, reduce the magnitude of 
income variations in exchange for a reduction in expected income. Accordingly, the 
fundamental reason for the correlation between personal and corporate income declarations to 
tax authorities in the present set-up is that corporate tax payments affect the manager's personal 
tax liability in different states to a differential extent.  
It has to be emphasised, though, that the direction of the correlation between the amount of 
corporate and personal income tax evasion is ambiguous. This is the case because the manager 
will attempt to diversify risk but will also obtain a higher expected income when he chooses to   8
 
take a (greater) second risk. The net impact of adding the second risk (personal income tax 
evasion) on the first (corporate income tax evasion) is uncertain. Given four possible outcomes 
of the tax evasion gamble, it is not feasible to determine general conditions, for example with 
respect to the attitude towards risk, which allow establishing whether the income or 
substitution effect of a change in an exogenous variable dominates. 
The finding summed up in Proposition 2 is supportive of the conjecture by Joulfaian (2000, p. 
698) that "managerial preferences, such as attitude towards risk or simply intrinsic dishonesty, 
controlling for tax and detection rates, may determine a firm's compliance behaviour." His 
empirical finding "that firms with managers who have understated personal income taxes 
experience greater noncompliance" (p. 700) is a feasible outcome which may be derived from 
the general model. However, the framework also allows for the opposite correlation. 
Formally, tax evasion entailing an uncertain outcome is equivalent to an according behaviour 
with a certain payoff, making use of an appropriately defined cost-of-evasion function and the 
concept of the certainty equivalent (cf. Cowell 1990b). This equivalence clarifies that it is not 
the uncertain outcome of corporate income tax evasion per se that creates a link between the 
optimal amounts of personal and corporate income declarations. Such a relationship will 
generally exist if the (expected or certain) costs (or gains) of reducing the payment of one tax 
are affected by the optimal amount of the other tax paid. In the model under consideration, 
corporate income tax payments affect personal income, but personal income tax payments do 
not alter profits. Section 3 assumes certain costs of corporate tax avoidance in addition. Thus, 
the payoff from personal income tax evasion has no repercussions on the costs or gains from 
corporate tax avoidance. In Section 4.1, the payoff from corporate income tax evasion varies 
with the extent of personal income tax evasion. In the above set-up, this effect arises because of 
the uncertainty which corporate income tax evasion causes. However, the same qualitative 
impact will occur if the costs of corporate income tax evasion are certain, as long as a cost-of-
corporate-income-tax-evasion-function depends on the extent of personal income tax evasion. 
 
4.2 Special Case: Correlation of Detection Probabilities 
To circumvent the (analytical) ambiguity with respect to the direction of the relationship 
between personal and corporate income tax evasion as summarised in Proposition 2, suppose 
that detecting corporate income tax evasion induces tax authorities to investigate the personal 
income tax declaration of the manager as well. Alternatively, it may be assumed that a manager 
who is detected evading personal income taxes can be certain that the tax declaration of the   9
 
company will be inspected too. In either of the cases, the number of possible states will be 
reduced from four to three. While the amounts of personal and corporate income tax evasion 
continue to be related, the direction of the correlation remains ambiguous. This is the case 
because the fundamental features of a world with four possible states continue to apply in a 
world with three states. That is, the payoff from varying one evasion activity affects the costs 
(or gains) from the other, and vice versa. 
To resolve the ambiguous relationship between personal and corporate income tax evasion, 
presume further that detection probabilities are perfectly correlated. Such a perfect correlation 
yields two outcomes (i = 2, 3) only and can be modelled by defining 0 < z := pq < 1 and 1 - z 
:= (1 - p)(1 - q). Situations in which either only the manager personally or solely the firm are 
fined cannot arise so that u(θ1) and u(θ4) are constant and u(θ1) = u(θ4) = u'(θ1) = u'(θ4) = 0 
can be assumed in equations (1), (5), and (6). The first-order conditions (5) and (6) then 
become: 
[] []0 3 ' u ) z 1 ( ) t ] t ) Y A [( ' F 1 ( 2 ' zu ) ' C 1 ( 0
V
= θ − + − Ψ − θ − ⇒ =
Φ ∂
∂
    ( 5 ' )  
[] [] 0 3 ' u ) z 1 ( ]) t ) Y A [( ' F 1 ( 2 ' zu 0
Y
V
= θ − + − Ψ − θ ⇒ =
∂
∂
     ( 6 ' )  
These conditions can only hold simultaneously if C'[] = F'[](1 - t)/(1 - F'[]t) applies, entailing 
F'[(ΨA - Y)t]t < 1 in an interior optimum, as C'[(Π - Φ)s] > 0 for Π > Φ. Since the marginal 
fine C' for profit tax evasion is independent of the amount of personal income taxes evaded, the 
optimal declaration of profits is not influenced by personal preferences of the manager, i.e. the 
curvature of his utility function. However, profit and personal income (tax) declarations are 
related insofar as that a variation in exogenous variables will generally alter both optimal tax 
declarations. Assuming a linear fine for personal income tax (F'' = 0), a higher penalty F for 
personal income tax evasion can be shown to raise the extent of corporate income misreporting 
and to reduce the amount of personal income tax evasion. The same prediction is obtained for a 
rise in the tax rate t on personal income if the measure of absolute risk aversion is constant. A 
higher tax rate s on corporate income lowers the extent of corporate and raises that of personal 
income tax evasion.
7 Accordingly, the model suggests that if detection probabilities are 
perfectly correlated, personal and corporate income tax evasion are negatively linked. 
The intuition for the findings is the following: a higher fine for personal income tax evasion 
raises the costs of evasion. Therefore, the personal income declaration is raised. To counteract 
                                                 
7 The respective proofs are to be found in the appendix.   10
 
the decrease in expected income the manager amplifies the extent of corporate tax evasion. 
Given that there are only two states - detection and non-detection - the marginal gains from 
corporate and personal income tax evasion are identical, as the inspection of the second terms 
in equations (5') and (6') reveals. However, the costs of evasion are related inversely, as 
indicated by a comparison of the first terms in equations (5') and (6'), taking into account C' > 1 
for Ft < 1, as F' > 1. A similar reasoning will apply to a higher tax rate t on personal income if 
the income effect of a tax rate change does not invalidate the increase in the fine F(Ψ - Y)t, that 
is if the manager exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. A higher tax rate s on corporate 
income ceteris paribus raises the costs of corporate tax evasion C[(Π - Φ)s]. Since the marginal 
costs of corporate tax evasion will have to be constant if according decisions are optimal, 
corporate tax evasions needs to be raised. However, the gain from declaring personal income 
rises so that there is again a negative correlation. 
The results can be summarised as follows: 
Corollary 3 
If the detection probabilities for corporate and personal income tax evasion activities are 
perfectly correlated, profit tax evasion will be independent of the manager's preferences. 
Variations in exogenous parameters that change the extent of corporate income tax evasion 
alter the amount of personal income tax evasion in the opposite direction. 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 indicate that corporate income tax evasion choices cannot be 
separated from decisions about personal income tax evasion if the net returns from the former 
are uncertain or, more generally, vary with the extent of personal income tax evasion. This 
finding ties in with the suggestion by Yaniv (1995) and a result by Panteghini (2000) regarding 
the non-separability of, on the one hand, a firm's output or investment decisions and, on the 
other hand, tax evasion choices in a setting in which output or returns from investment are 
uncertain. The result is furthermore compatible with, first, Alm's (1988) and Alm and 
McCallin's (1990) analyses which indicate that the amounts of personal income taxes evaded 
and avoided, respectively, are not independent and, second, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider's 
(2005) finding that changes in income or enforcement parameters will have ambiguous 
consequences on optimal choices as the returns of the two sources of evasion are correlated.  
   11
 
5. Conclusions  
Can the determinants of tax base declarations by firms be treated separately from personal 
income tax evasion choices by the firm's decision makers? The - scarce - empirical evidence 
suggests that the answer to this question is 'No'. The analysis of this paper has assumed that a 
risk-averse manager can increase his (expected) income by evading personal income taxes and 
also by reducing the firm's tax payments below the required or intended level. It is shown that 
the optimal level of profit tax avoidance is independent of the manager's choices with respect 
to personal income taxes evaded because the gains and costs from profit tax avoidance are 
certain. This is the case since the outcome of the personal income tax evasion gamble does not 
affect the manager's net gain from corporate income tax avoidance. However, if reducing profit 
tax payments introduces an additional source of uncertainty into the manager's optimisation 
problem, as in the case of corporate income tax evasion, the respective choices will no longer 
be independent of personal income tax declarations. The reason for the correlation is that the 
gains from personal income tax evasion change with the gains form corporate income tax 
evasion,  and vice versa. However, the direction of the correlation between the extent of 
personal income and corporate income or profit tax evasion is uncertain. This is the case since 
the manager can, on the one hand, attempt to diversify the risk due to personal income tax 
evasion activities by reducing corporate income tax evasion. On the other hand, expected 
income may decline. For the special case of perfectly correlated detection probabilities, the 
model predicts that variations in exogenous parameters that change the extent of corporate tax 
evasion alter the amount of personal tax evasion in the opposite direction because the risk-
diversification impact prevails. 
The results of this paper imply, first, that tax evasion activities by firms can only be separated 
from personal income tax evasion choices by its decision-makers under special circumstances. 
Accordingly, the theoretical literature has ignored potentially important determinants of 
corporate income tax evasion or avoidance. This finding is likely to hold for other taxes levied 
on and evaded or avoided by firms as well. Second, in empirical analyses of evasion behaviour 
by firms, the impact of preferences of its decision-makers should be taken into account. Third, 
while it may well be the case that observing a manager evading taxes provides information on 
evasion activities by the firm in which he works, the current analytical set-up does not allow - 
possibly to the dismay of tax authorities and the delight of tax-evading managers - to predict 
and exploit the nature of this relationship. Finally, if tax evasion generates an uncertain net 
payoff, while tax avoidance is characterised by certain gains and costs, the managers' personal 
preferences only affect evasion but not avoidance behaviour.   12
 
6. Appendix - Comparative Statics for the Setting with Perfectly Correlated   
     Detection Probabilities (Section 4.2) 
A linear fine for personal income tax evasion implies F'' = 0 and F' = F. Given optimal choices, 
the first-order conditions in a setting with perfectly correlated detection probabilities are given 
by (6') and  0 ) Ft 1 /( ) F 1 ( ] s ) [( ' C 1 : A = − − − Φ − Π − = . Differentiation, where subscripts 
indicate partial derivatives, yields: AΦ = C''s > 0, As = -C''(Π - Φ) < 0, AY = 0, AF = (1 - t)/(1 
- Ft)2 > 0, At = - (1 - F)F/(1 - Ft)2 > 0, VYY = -t[zu''[θ2](1 - F)2 + (1 - z)u''[θ3]] > 0, VYΦ = 
VYs(s/Φ) = -µs[zu''[θ2](1 - F)(1 - C')(1 - Ft) + (1 - z)u''[θ3]] > 0 as (1 - C')(1 - Ft) < 0, VYt = -
[zu''[θ2](1 - F)(Y + F(Ψ - Y) + (1 - z)u''[θ3]Y] > 0, and VYF = -z[u'[θ2] + u''[θ2](1 - F)t(Ψ - 
Y)] < 0. The change in profit declarations Φ owing to an increase in any variable x, x = F, s, t, 
is given by dΦ/dx = -Ax/AΦ. Making use of the definition of A, the first-order condition (6') 
and the definition of absolute risk-aversion RA(θi) := - u''[θi]/u'[θi] > 0, for i = 2, 3, the 
changes in underreported profits (Π - Φ) and personal income (Ψ - Y) are given by: 
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For a constant measure of absolute risk aversion (RA(θi) = RA(θ), i = 2, 3), (A.6) collapses to: 
0 ) Y ( F
) Ft 1 ( ' ' C
' FC ) ' C 1 (
YY V
) ( A R ] 3 [ ' u ) z 1 (
dt




⎡ − Ψ −
−
− µ θ θ −
=
− Ψ
    ( A . 6 ' )  
 
7. References 
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo (1972), Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, Journal of Public Economics 1, 323-338. 
Alm, James (1988), Compliance Costs and the Tax Avoidance-Tax Evasion Decision, Public 
Finance Quarterly 16(1), 31-66. 
Alm, James (1999), Tax Compliance and Tax Administration, 741-768, in: Hildreth, W. 
Bartley and James A. Richardson (eds), Handbook on Taxation, New York, 
NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
Alm, James and Nancy J. McCallin (1990), Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion, and Portfolio 
Choice, Public Finance/Finances Publiques 45(2), 193-200. 
Andreoni, James, Erard, Brian and Jonathan Feinstein (1998), Tax Compliance, Journal of 
Economic Literature 36(2), 818-860. 
Baldry, Jonathan C. (1987), Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental 
Results, Public Finance/ Finances Publiques 42(3), 357-383. 
Balestrino, Alessandro and Umberto Galmarini (2003), Imperfect Tax Compliance and the 
Optimal Provision of Public Goods, Bulletin of Economic Research 55(1), 
37-52. 
Chen, Kong-Ping and C.Y. Cyrus Chu (2005), Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: a 
Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion, Rand Journal of Economics 36(1), 
151-164. 
Cowell, Frank A. (1990a), Cheating the Government - The Economics of Evasion, MIT Press: 
Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London. 
Cowell, Frank A. (1990b), Tax Sheltering and the Cost of Evasion, Oxford Economic Papers 
42(1), 231-243. 
Crocker, Keith J. and Joel Slemrod (2005), Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs, Journal 
of Public Economics 89, 1593-1610. 
Joulfaian, David (2000), Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences, Review 
of Economics and Statistics 82, 698-701. 
Landskroner, Y., Paroush, J. and I. Swary (1990), Tax Evasion and Portfolio Decisions, Public 
Finance/Finances Publiques 45(3), 409-422. 
Lee, Kangoh (1995), Risk-Taking and Business Income Tax Evasion, Public Finance/Finances 
Publiques 50(1), 106-120. 
Lee, Kangoh (1998), Tax Evasion, Monopoly, and Nonneutral Profit Taxes, National Tax 
Journal 51, 333-338. 
Marchese, Carla (2004), Taxation, Black Markets, and Other Unintended Consequences, 237-
275, in: Backhaus, Jürgen G. and Richard E. Wagner (2004), Handbook of 
Public Finance, Boston et al. 
Marelli, Massimo (1984), On Indirect Tax Evasion, Journal of Public Economics 25, 181-196. 
Marelli, Massimo and R. Martina (1988), Tax Evasion and Strategic Behaviour of the Firms, 
Journal of Public Economics 37, 55-69. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Mark Rider (2005), Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory and 
Evidence, National Tax Journal 68(1), 51-76.   14
 
Panteghini, Paolo M. (2000), Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility, Public Finance Re-
view 28, 199-209. 
Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki (2002), Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, 
1423-1470, in: Auerbach, A. J. and Martin Feldstein (eds), Handbook of 
Public Economics, Vol. 3, Elsevier: Amsterdam et al. 
Wang, Leonard F. S. and John L. Conant (1988), Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions 
of the Uncertain Monopolist, National Tax Journal 41, 579-581. 
Wrede, Matthias (1995), Tax Evasion and Risk-Taking: is Tax Evasion Desirable?, Public 
Finance/Finances Publiques 50(2), 303-316. 
Yaniv, Gideon (1995), A Note on the Tax Evading Firm, National Tax Journal 48, 113-120. 
Yaniv, Gideon (1996), Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: Note, Public Finance 
Quarterly 24, 501-505. 
Yaniv, Gideon (1999), Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy, 
International Tax and Public Finance 6, 27-38. 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1974), A Note on Income Tax Evasion: a Theoretical Analysis, Journal of 
Public Economics 3, 201-202. CESifo Working Paper Series 




1716 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 
Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model, May 
2006 
 
1717 Paul De Grauwe and Agnieszka Markiewicz, Learning to Forecast the Exchange Rate: 
Two Competing Approaches, May 2006 
 
1718 Sijbren Cnossen, Tobacco Taxation in the European Union, May 2006 
 
1719 Marcel Gérard and Fernando Ruiz, Interjurisdictional Competition for Higher Education 
and Firms, May 2006 
 
1720 Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl, China’s Exchange Rate and International 
Adjustment in Wages, Prices, and Interest Rates: Japan Déjà Vu?, May 2006 
 
1721 Paolo M. Panteghini, The Capital Structure of Multinational Companies under Tax 
Competition, May 2006 
 
1722 Johannes Becker, Clemens Fuest and Thomas Hemmelgarn, Corporate Tax Reform and 
Foreign Direct Investment in Germany – Evidence from Firm-Level Data, May 2006 
 
1723 Christian Kleiber, Martin Sexauer and Klaus Waelde, Bequests, Taxation and the 
Distribution of Wealth in a General Equilibrium Model, May 2006 
 
1724 Axel Dreher and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the 
UN General Assembly?, May 2006 
 
1725 Swapan K. Bhattacharya and Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Prospects of Regional 
Cooperation in Trade, Investment and Finance in Asia: An Empirical Analysis on 
BIMSTEC Countries and Japan, May 2006 
 
1726 Philippe Choné and Laurent Linnemer, Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain 
Efficiency Gains, May 2006 
 
1727 Daniel Houser and Thomas Stratmann, Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on 
Campaign Finance Reform, May 2006 
 
1728 E. Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, A Century 
of Shocks: The Evolution of the German City Size Distribution 1925 – 1999, May 2006 
 
1729 Clive Bell and Hans Gersbach, Growth and Enduring Epidemic Diseases, May 2006 
 
1730 W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete 
Contracts, May 2006 
  
1731 Jan K. Brueckner and Ricardo Flores-Fillol, Airline Schedule Competition: Product-
Quality Choice in a Duopoly Model, May 2006 
 
1732 Kerstin Bernoth and Guntram B. Wolff, Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal 
Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia, May 2006 
 
1733 Emmanuelle Auriol and Pierre M. Picard, Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting 
with Private Monopoly, May 2006 
 
1734 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Modelling Structural Breaks in the 
US, UK and Japanese Unemployment Rates, May 2006 
 
1735 Emily J. Blanchard, Reevaluating the Role of Trade Agreements: Does Investment 
Globalization Make the WTO Obsolete?, May 2006 
 
1736 Per Engström and Bertil Holmlund, Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax 
Country: Evidence from Sweden, May 2006 
 
1737 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Cycles and Indeterminacy in Overlapping 
Generations Economies with Stone-Geary Preferences, May 2006 
 
1738 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Supply Constraints and Housing Prices, May 2006 
 
1739 Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Transition 
Economies: Surveying the Surveyable, June 2006 
 
1740 Ben J. Heijdra and Ward E. Romp, Ageing and Growth in the Small Open Economy, 
June 2006 
 
1741 Robert Fenge and Volker Meier, Subsidies for Wages and Infrastructure: How to 
Restrain Undesired Immigration, June 2006 
 
1742 Robert S. Chirinko and Debdulal Mallick, The Elasticity of Derived Demand, Factor 
Substitution and Product Demand: Corrections to Hicks’ Formula and Marshall’s Four 
Rules, June 2006 
 
1743 Harry P. Bowen, Haris Munandar and Jean-Marie Viaene, Evidence and Implications of 
Zipf’s Law for Integrated Economies, June 2006 
 
1744 Markku Lanne and Helmut Luetkepohl, Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks via 
Changes in Volatility, June 2006 
 
1745 Timo Trimborn, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger, Multi-Dimensional 
Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numberical Procedure, June 2006 
 
1746 Vivek H. Dehejia and Yiagadeesen Samy, Labor Standards and Economic Integration in 
the European Union: An Empirical Analysis, June 2006 
 
1747 Carlo Altavilla and Paul De Grauwe, Forecasting and Combining Competing Models of 
Exchange Rate Determination, June 2006  
1748 Olaf Posch and Klaus Waelde, Natural Volatility, Welfare and Taxation, June 2006 
 
1749 Christian Holzner, Volker Meier and Martin Werding, Workfare, Monitoring, and 
Efficiency Wages, June 2006 
 
1750 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Agglomeration and Aid, 
June 2006 
 
1751 Robert Fenge and Jakob von Weizsäcker, Mixing Bismarck and Child Pension Systems: 
An Optimum Taxation Approach, June 2006 
 
1752 Helge Berger and Michael Neugart, Labor Courts, Nomination Bias, and 
Unemployment in Germany, June 2006 
 
1753 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, A 
Collective Household Model of Time Allocation - a Comparison of Native Dutch and 
Immigrant Households in the Netherlands, June 2006 
 
1754 Marko Koethenbuerger, Ex-Post Redistribution in a Federation: Implications for 
Corrective Policy, July 2006 
 
1755 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Heinrich Ursprung, The Impact of Globalization on 
the Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence from Panel Data, July 2006 
 
1756 Richard Schmidtke, Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good, July 2006 
 
1757 J. Atsu Amegashie, Intentions and Social Interactions, July 2006 
 
1758 Alessandro Balestrino, Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison 
Income Effect, July 2006 
 
1759 Øystein Thøgersen, Intergenerational Risk Sharing by Means of Pay-as-you-go 
Programs – an Investigation of Alternative Mechanisms, July 2006 
 
1760 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland, Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms, 
July 2006 
 
1761 Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wojcik, Catching-up, Inflation Differentials and Credit 
Booms in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union: Some Implications for EMU and new EU 
Member States, July 2006 
 
1762 Robert Dur, Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-
Tolerance, July 2006 
 
1763 Christa Hainz, Business Groups in Emerging Markets – Financial Control and 
Sequential Investment, July 2006 
 
1764 Didier Laussel and Raymond Riezman, Fixed Transport Costs and International Trade, 
July 2006 
  
1765 Rafael Lalive, How do Extended Benefits Affect Unemployment Duration? A 
Regression Discontinuity Approach, July 2006 
 
1766 Eric Hillebrand, Gunther Schnabl and Yasemin Ulu, Japanese Foreign Exchange 
Intervention and the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate: A Simultaneous Equations Approach 
Using Realized Volatility, July 2006 
 
1767 Carsten Hefeker, EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms, July 
2006 
 
1768 Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants: 
Welfare-State Determinants across Countries, July 2006 
 
1769 Maarten Bosker and Harry Garretsen, Geography Rules Too! Economic Development 
and the Geography of Institutions, July 2006 
 
1770 M. Hashem Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, Testing Dependence among Serially 
Correlated Multi-category Variables, July 2006 
 
1771 Juergen von Hagen and Haiping Zhang, Financial Liberalization in a Small Open 
Economy, August 2006 
 
1772 Alessandro Cigno, Is there a Social Security Tax Wedge?, August 2006 
 
1773 Peter Egger, Simon Loretz, Michael Pfaffermayr and Hannes Winner, Corporate 
Taxation and Multinational Activity, August 2006 
 
1774 Jeremy S.S. Edwards, Wolfgang Eggert and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Measurement 
of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay, August 2006 
 
1775 Scott Alan Carson and Thomas N. Maloney, Living Standards in Black and White: 
Evidence from the Heights of Ohio Prison Inmates, 1829 – 1913, August 2006 
 
1776 Richard Schmidtke, Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities, 
August 2006 
 
1777 Ben J. Heijdra and Jenny E. Ligthart, The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy in 
Small Open Economies, August 2006 
 
1778 Jay Pil Choi, How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and 
Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights, August 2006 
 
1779 Ludger Woessmann, Efficiency and Equity of European Education and Training 
Policies, August 2006 
 
1780 Gregory Ponthiere, Growth, Longevity and Public Policy, August 2006 
 
1781 Laszlo Goerke, Corporate and Personal Income Tax Declarations, August 2006 